published “Political encyclopedia” 735-page volume “defense of Leningrad. 1941-1945. Documents and materials” contains 281 archival document. More than 80% of them are introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. And in the leaves of the usage of a number of cases non-existent record: more than 70 years no one is held in the hands.
Responsible editor of the book and author of the introductory article is Andrey K. Sorokin – Director of the RGASPI and columnist of the magazine “Rodina”.
the Researcher carefully read the new book, will be rewarded. He will be able, in particular, open-minded look at the role of the Supreme Commander in the great Patriotic war. “Stalin in many situations does not look quite familiar. Turns out it wasn’t, he drives to the bayonet of the Soviet infantry, it turns out that he repeatedly demands from the commanders of the fronts to keep alive the power of”1. For the reader convinced of the validity of this claim, let us quote some of the most interesting documents of a unique collection.
Only ten days of 1418 days of the war and 872 days of Leningrad’s defence.
17 Aug 1941. the 57th day of the war. German forces two days earlier broke into Novgorod, took Narva. It is 134 km in a straight line from Leningrad. Above the town looms a real danger of change. Stalin and the chief of the General staff, Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov sent commander in chief North-Western direction to Marshal Voroshilov and member of the Military Council, Zhdanov telegram:
“to Eliminate this danger it is possible, as the Germans have forces here a little, and thrown to the aid of the new three divisions, under proper guidance, could eliminate the danger. Rate can’t put up with the moods of hopelessness and inability to take decisive steps, talking about what was already done and nothing more is impossible”2.
this is a just reproach Voroshilov meets the creation of volunteer labor battalions with antediluvian weapons. The militia was supplied with obsolete rifles, pikes and daggers. It was a necessary measure. In Leningrad with modern small arms, the situation was very badly. Its lack is encountered and the sailors of the Baltic fleet. “In order to get out of the situation, the captain resorted sometimes to the artisanal manufacturing of cold weapons – knives, daggers, swords, recalled the people’s Commissar of the Navy Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov. – …No-one thought I would have to send so many sailors. But the threat to Leningrad from the land grew and required mobilization of all forces”3.
Remembering the experience of the Civil war, Marshal Voroshilov offers workers to choose their battalion commanders. Marshal aimlessly wasting precious time on trivial things and forgets about the Chapter��Mr. and misses the organization of the artillery of the defense of Leningrad. Powerful artillery of the Baltic fleet is not used in the defense of the city. Is not timely evacuation of the population and industrial enterprises of the city.
the Reaction of Stalin correct in form. And very hard – in fact.
22 Aug 1941. the 62nd day of the war. Already began the defense of Leningrad on the approaches to the city. During the negotiations on the direct line Stalin gave the leaders of the defense of Leningrad an object lesson in operational art and polychromati:
“This defense has not been satisfactory… We think the defense of Leningrad should be primarily artillery defense. You need to occupy all the hills in the Pulkovo area… If not enough of the army artillery, you could take off from ships, artillery and install in the whole environment of Leningrad.
… the Link to your congestion is ridiculous. We are no less overwhelmed you. You are just disorganized people do not feel responsible for their actions, and therefore act as an isolated island, with no one being considered.
…will Immediately cancel the elective principle, because it can ruin the whole army. Elected commander of the beginningless, as in the case of pressure on voters, it instantly re-elected. And we need, as we know, the sovereign commanders. It is necessary to introduce the principle of election workers battalions, it will immediately spread to the whole army, like an infection,”4.
the Elective principle in the militia be immediately eliminated.
August 26, 1941. the 66 th day of war. A few days earlier, the Germans captured Chudovo and cut the Oktyabrskaya railway. Then took Luban. The red army left Moscow highway and went North. The commander of the front, Lieutenant-General Markian Popov to urgently plug the holes in the broken defense, asks Bet to send two divisions of the newly formed 52nd reserve army of Lieutenant-General Nikolai Klykov.
Army Klykova there is only three days. Stalin knows this, and refuses
“Divisions Klykova I can’t tell you, they are completely raw, nickelocene, and it would be criminal to throw them to the front, still would have fled, but the technique would be handed over to the enemy. …If your people were able to work according to plan, and two weeks ago in order to of foresight required 2-3 divisions now, they would be ready for you, but the trouble is that you love to work and live like a Gypsy, from day to day, not looking ahead”5.
on the same day, Stalin (enraged, judging by the style of response) for the first time resorted to the manual way of organizing the defense of Leningrad. And signed a decree of the State defense Committee N586, claiming the mandate of people’s Commissar for foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov, the secret��ryu of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) G. M. Malenkov, Commissar of the Navy Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, the designated GKO of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, Colonel-General of aviation P. F. Zhigarev and Colonel-General of artillery N. N. Voronov. The named executives vested with extraordinary powers and will fly to Leningrad “to address and resolve … all issues of the defense of Leningrad and the evacuation of the enterprises and the population”6.
In his memoirs, Chief Marshal of artillery Nikolay Nikolaevich Voronov was preserved expressive story about this business:
“To my surprise, the city continued to live very quietly. You would think that the fighting takes place on the approaches to Berlin and not at the walls of Leningrad. The evacuation of the population has not yet proceeded. There is clearly underestimated the threat that was bearing down on the city.
Ten days working our Commission. She found it necessary to eliminate the obsolete North-West direction and to transfer its functions to the Leningrad front.
Abruptly the question was raised about the need for urgent evacuation of Leningrad children, women and the elderly, as well as scientific institutions and factories whose products could not be used for the needs of the city and front. The Commission called for the speedy adjustment of all life on a war footing”7.
“I’m Afraid that Leningrad will be put idiotic stupid…”
29 Aug 1941. the 69th day of the war. Important railway junction of Tosno occupied by the Germans. Remain only the day before the Germans come to the river and cut the last railway route connecting Leningrad with the country. Stalin makes a disappointing conclusion:
“If this continues, I’m afraid that Leningrad will be put idiotic stupid, and all of the Leningrad division of the risk of being captured. What do Popov and Voroshilov? They don’t even report on the measures they think to do against such a danger. They are busy looking for new lines of retreat, they see this as their task. Where do they get such an abyss of pure rustic passivity and resignation”8.
“Two air division never got your job…”
4 Sep 1941. The 75th day of the war. Two days earlier, in Leningrad made the first decline in food standards on the cards: workers and engineers began to issue 600 grams of bread daily, employees – 400 g, dependents and children up to 12 years – 300 g. in the Face of blatant disorganization and confusion in the management of troops of the Leningrad front, Stalin and Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov and Zhdanov arrange the dressing:
“In Tikhvin are 2 air division 39 and 2, both are at Your disposal but they never got your jobs”9.
These two divisions, fighter and bomber, at the beginning of September it moved to airfields in the districtIona Tikhvin. The headquarters of the front of them “lost”. Voroshilov and Zhdanov had “forgotten” about their existence, and, fearful of the righteous wrath of the Host, tried to keep a good face on a bad game, but caught in their own lies. At first pretended that he is very excited to receive two new air divisions, and then began to say that never forgot about their existence, and “only the inclement weather of recent days have prevented the use of these air division…”.
Stalin’s Patience runs out:
“One of two things – either these divisions represent for you a pleasant surprise, or they are well known you were. One of the two”10.
“What are you doing your aircraft?”
September 9, 1941. 80-th day of the war. The previous day the Germans captured Shlisselburg and closed the siege ring around Leningrad. Stalin and his colleagues in the Politburo, Molotov, Malenkov and Beria in the cipher telegrams to angrily accuse Voroshilov and Zhdanov:
“We are outraged by your behavior, reflected in the fact that you tell us only about the loss of our particular locality, but usually not a word report on what you have taken in order to stop losing the city and the station. …What are you doing your aircraft, why doesn’t she support the actions of our troops in the field?”11
Stalin’s Patience was exhausted.
the Evening of 11 September, Bet has decided to withdraw Marshal Voroshilov in Moscow. On 14 September, Marshal Voroshilov was removed from his post and replaced by General of the army Zhukov. In these tragic days, the Supreme Commander was not certain that Leningrad would be defended.
the Leader prepares for the worst.
13 Sep 1941. 84th day of the war. The Germans captured the city Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina). It is 42 km in a straight line from Leningrad. The Chairman of GKO, Stalin signed the mandate appointing the Deputy people’s Commissar of internal Affairs Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov, the bonds authorized at the special cases:
“Tov. Merkulov assigned… carefully check the preparation of the explosion and the destruction of businesses, important buildings and bridges in Leningrad in case of a forced withdrawal of our troops from the Leningrad district”12.
at the same time, a decision was made about the mining ships of the Baltic fleet. Says the Admiral of fleet of Soviet Union Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov:
“I like the Cabinet and, against the habit, sitting on a sofa that stood by the wall with the window, Stalin asked me a few questions. He was interested in what ships we have in the Baltic, where they now stand and participate in the defense of Leningrad. …
– No combat ship should not fall into enemy hands, he said.
Pereproshit, do I understand, Stalin emphasized that in case of default this order the guilty will be severely punished. I knew that a newwait, this issue is not time, and waited for further instructions.
…Yes, Stalin was considered with the possibility of the abandonment of Leningrad, otherwise he would not have taken such a serious decision. But this does not mean that the Supreme Commander recognized the hopeless situation of Leningrad. Rather, it says that he feared that our ships were serviceable in the hands of the enemy”13.
“Focus divisions of eight or ten … and break”
October 23, 1941. the 124th day of the war. In Moscow for the fourth day state of siege. The fate of the capital hangs in the balance. Stalin the Deputy chief of the General staff major-General Alexander Vasilevsky reports to the heads of the defence of Leningrad note:
“We require decisive and quick action. Focus divisions of eight or ten… and break to the East. It is necessary for the case of Leningrad will be withheld, and in the event of surrender of Leningrad. For us army important. Require decisive action. Stalin”14.
November 8, 1941. 140th day of the war. Supreme Commander comprehends the sad experience of unsuccessful attempts to break the blockade and re-explains the basics of tactics and operational art – this time the new commander of the Leningrad front Lieutenant General Michael Hosino. In war, sacrifices are inevitable, but this does not give the military commander the right to misuse the cash human and material resources:
“We are told that after the artillery preparation, the infantry did not dare to go forward, but you should know that infantry without tanks will not go bad… You spend your strength. …Can infantry division with its rifles and machine guns to cope with the fortified areas of the enemy. It is necessary first to destroy the fortified artillery, mortars, to put then in the course of the tanks, and just behind the tanks the infantry division can show itself as a real force. Without tanks the infantry is helpless in the face of enemy defensive lines”15.
April 1, 1942. 284 th day of the war. According to the report of Sovinformburo, this day “on the front of something significant has happened.” Politburo of the CPSU(b) adopts a resolution about the poor performance of one of its members of K. E. Voroshilov. Three pages of typewritten text scrupulously lists made by the former people’s Commissar of defense and the “first red officer” numerous errors, ranging from the war with Finland in 1939-1940 and ending his participation in the great Patriotic war.
Characteristically, the document never mentions the title of Marshal Voroshilov:
“…Comrade. Voroshilov did not cope with the charged matter and failed to organize the defense of Leningrad. In view of the foregoing, the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) decides:
1. To admit that T. Voroshilov did not justify itself on the work entrusted to him at the front.
2. Send T. Voroshilov on the rear military work”16.
1. Sorokin A. K. the defense of Leningrad: archival documents show // the defense of Leningrad. 1941-1945. Documents and materials / ed. come. article and reply. edited by A. K. Sorokin. M.: Political encyclopedia, 2019. P. 29.
2. The Defense Of Leningrad. 1941-1945. Documents and materials. P. 88.
3. Kuznetsov N. G. Course to victory. M.: The Voice, 2000. P. 130.
4. The Defense Of Leningrad. 1941-1945. Documents and materials. P. 89, 91, 92.
5. Ibid. S. 99.
6. Ibid. C. 13.
7. Voronov N. N. In the service of the military. M.: Voenizdat, 1963. P. 186.
8. The Defense Of Leningrad. 1941-1945. Documents and materials. P. 102.
9. Ibid. P. 28.
10. Ibid. P. 30.
11. Ibid. P. 110.
12. Ibid. P. 430.
13. Kuznetsov N. G. Course to victory. M.: The Voice, 2000. S. 137-139.
14. The Defense Of Leningrad. 1941-1945. Documents and materials. P. 116.
15. Ibid. C. 119, 120, 121.
16. Ibid. Pp. 165-166.
