In the history of the great Patriotic war has left a bright trace and sabotage operations. They were used in almost all theaters of war. Was no exception and the battle for Caucasus 1942-1943.
In August 1942 the troops of Germany and her allies invaded the Caucasus, wholly using their numerical and technical superiority. The red army retreated in the foothill areas, in an effort to stop the advance of the enemy by all possible means. So, in the operational Directive of August 19, 1942, contained a reference to army commanders, commanders of corps and divisions to make an active defense, use special forces for actions against enemy communications1.
the Principles of the activities of these groups were corrected the next day. Commander of the North Caucasus front Marshal Budyonny ordered “to fight on communications of the opponent causing him sudden short sharp shock in the rear, to organize anti-sabotage squads … each army to have at least 4-5 commando units … these units subordinate directly to the chief of staff of the army, on whom to lay the guidelines on the organization and combat activities of subversive groups.
part of the teams – 25 people.
1 Department of machine gunners – 10 people.
2 AV2
3-5 persons sappers
One radio “Sever” or “RB”.
At the head of the detachment to put an experienced combat commander with strong-willed qualities. A squad to pick from persistent, proven in combat soldiers and commanders of the ml. To ensure the detachment of the party-Komsomol layer. All part of pick up training and combatant units, To carry out combat missions, the detachment highlight ammunition within 3-4 b[OE]to[komplektov]; 5-6 pieces of grenades on the soldier; the appropriate number of Molotov cocktails and “BB”. Squad assist concentrates from local resources… nature of the action – detachments are thrown behind enemy lines to a depth of 30-50 km for 5-7 days. Each squad is given an area or stretch of road. Exit and arrival of groups to the area of operations to carry out without roads.
the Squad to put the General problem of the destruction of forces and means of the enemy, giving him the freedom to solve the problem in accordance with the situation.
the hit squad should be applied after intelligence … as guides to attract local residents, checked through the organs of the NKVD… the Willingness of groups to 1.9.42 formation lay to the war councils of the armies”3.
In the final operational summary black sea group of forces in September 1942 he revealed another reason for the use of fighter-commando units. Rely on them had due to the lack of fighting strength and the need of accumulation of forces for future offensive operations. But, “despite the large scale and mass actionthe results of these troops, defense troops of the black sea group as a whole in September was insufficiently active”4.
the Headquarters of the 18th army in September, 1942, presented a detailed analysis of the reconnaissance and sabotage operations: “In the early days of the young, newly formed groups have not given the desired effect, but after a few days, the accumulation of experience, of stratagem, the acquiring of skills orientation to the mountain-wooded area, the quality of the troops has greatly improved. Units operated by ambushes and raids”5.
And in early September 1942 the Soviet fighter and sabotage groups managed to achieve the first success.
the Resort Goryachiy Klyuch is now well known to everyone who is heading to the black sea coast of Krasnodar region. At the end of August 1942 he was captured by the 198th German infantry division. Two weeks later, on 6 September, its commander, major General albert Beech was returning from the front in the village of Saratov, where the divisional headquarters. With him in the car “Opel Admiral” went to the chief of operations division major I. Buhl, was driving the Sergeant. At noon the General’s car was on the highway 2.5 km North-East from the Hot Key. During the passage over the bridge through a small, overgrown with bushes Creek “Opel Admiral” was attacked. The General and major were killed, the driver was severely wounded. The Germans organized combing of the area, and was taken prisoner by the red army, who reported that an ambush on the road made intelligence group 723rd rifle regiment 395-th infantry division of the 18th army. All these details became known from a report prepared at the headquarters of the German division. It was stressed that the attack was not committed by the guerrillas, and the sabotage detachment of the regular army6.
September 10 from captured German soldiers by Soviet intelligence learned of the death of General Beech, the information was confirmed by the data of the radio. Linking all the facts together, the command of the 56th army felt that the success was a credit to her fighter and sabotage groups, and chose to cast their commanders to medals “For courage”. In the award sheet of the commander of the first army anti-sabotage detachment of Lieutenant W. D. Masterko noted that “4.9.42 one of the groups of scouts on the way Maslov-Penza-Baku noticed a passenger car, which was moving in the direction of Maslov. Throwing a grenade machine was undermined and who was in it the commander of 198 p[ehotel] d[iviii of] major-General von Buk killed. This is confirmed by the testimony of the three captured soldiers, captured 10.9.42 G.”7. Similarly, these events are described in the award sheet of the commander of the second army anti-sabotage detachment of Lieutenant M. V. Kuguluand. Apparently, at the headquarters of the 56th army did not know all the details and could not assume that ambushed her saboteurs were not major-General A. Beech, and someone else. At the same time in the war diary of the 395-th infantry division nearby of the 12th army, whose soldiers actually conducted the operation described above, on September 7 were buying a note as follows: “the loss of PR[otune]ka from the RAID and sabotage groups 723 [th] with[strelkovogo] p[Olka] on the road from Saratov to Key 36 soldiers and officers, 4 cars. The actions of subversive groups scared PR[otune]ka, they take over partisans”8.
By November of 1942 on the front, black sea group of forces had been active for 24 of the squad. Three in the 16th infantry corps, four in the 18-th army, six in the 47th army and eleven in the 56-th army. The number is not always transformed into quality. From units of the 56th army, only three were engaged in battle with the enemy, two more limited intelligence, and the rest came back with nothing. The disappointing results were the reason for the investigation. In the 47th army and the 16th corps task completed only a third of the units. And only in 18-th army all destructive and subversive groups have managed to achieve success. Particularly impressive is the 22-day RAID of the detachment of captain A. N. Smirnov. It killed about 80 soldiers and officers of the enemy, taken six prisoners, destroyed two cars, several radio stations, phones and communication lines, six carts with flour, weapons, and valuable documents9.
In November 1942, in the 79th release Soyuzkinozhurnala was shown the plot of “Brave”. Its creators have captured the appearance of the scouts of the black sea fleet, their preparations for the new commando operations, returning from a RAID and captured them Romanian soldiers.
the experience of the scouts of the black sea fleet was in demand during the defense of the Western Caucasus. They were in the area of the passes of the Main Caucasian ridge, at a height of two and a half thousand meters, although no special training for action in the highlands had. The most active naval reconnaissance and sabotage groups operating in the area of Novorossiysk, where the front was joined to the sea. Here along with a group of intelligence staff of the black sea fleet acted scouts of the Novorossiysk naval base.
Separate reconnaissance-sabotage detachment of the base was formed on 13 September 1942 from the members of its coastal parts. He headed a new division captain M. A. Sobkanyuk, before directing one of the shore batteries. The commander of the Novorossiysk naval base GN Bachelors recalled that over the shoulders of the sailors was the defence of Odessa, the Crimea and the Caucasus. However, “the experience of action in behind enemy lines had a few. Nobody had special preparation for this. But not to take them was selfless sailor otagand, determined to fulfil any task”10.
a few days after the five intelligence officers studied the situation in the area South of Novorossiysk, has undergone a major operation. On the night of 19 September, four patrol and two torpedo boats landed 168 people. The main group of Marines made a three-kilometer March and attacked the Romanian garrison in Hlibivka and the other destroyed a guard post in the southern Ozereyka. Injured 20 scouts, three more were killed11 among the dead was the commander of the detachment of M. A. Sobkanyuk. Following the operation, the scouts were taken on September 26. From the beginning they were discovered by the enemy and were forced to fight with superior forces. The detachment suffered casualties, killed its commander, Junior Lieutenant V. G. Slouch. Only a month later, eight participants in the RAID were saved specifically aimed at the rear of the enemy, and scouts were evacuated to Noumea on boats. And the other two sailors had to go a long way in bypassing Novorossiysk, to cross the front line, they helped the guerrillas.
the results of the first attacks into the enemy rear required a reorganization of the squad. It was converted into a separate reconnaissance-sabotage company, consisting of five groups of 20 people each. Personnel began to hold lessons in unarmed combat, wielding various types of weapons, the cause of mine, disembarkation and return to the boat. Each sabotage operation was preceded by intelligence. In such a scenario, from 3 to 10 Oct 16 scouts studied the location and order of the service of the Romanian troops in the sukkah. And on the night of October 17, a group of 66 people, led by political instructor N. In. By Starshinov made an attack on Romanian strong points and without loss returned to their base. According to the memoirs of him, he had to do in the occupied territory is not typical for scouts work – agitation among the population. Was required to convey to local residents information about events at the front and to convince them of the falsity of the German propaganda and the imminent turning point in the war12.
Before the end of the year the scouts of the Novorossiysk base made five and eleven reconnaissance and sabotage raids behind enemy lines. Typically, these operations were carried out on dark nights, with the weather and moon phase. In some cases, boats would come to shore, and the scouts were landed dry-shod. Often had to land on boats. With winter approaching and worsening weather to do it became difficult. There were times when the boat overturned in stormy sea and were sailors in them killed. But the main danger was waiting for the scouts on land. After their first raids, the enemy began to carefully observe the beach and ��have reprisal measures to strengthen their defense.
the war diary of the 5th German army corps, which occupied the front area of Novorossiysk were several attacks on the strong points of coastal defense. In all cases, the attackers referred to as bandits, as the enemy called the Soviet partisans. In the entry of 18 October 1942 it was reported that the landing of saboteurs from the sea occur more often13.
on 1 November 1942 the headquarters of the 73rd German infantry division, which was part of the 5th corps, has prepared guidelines for the defense of the coast. They were based on recent experience in the fight against airborne troops. Upon detection of the landing of Soviet spies ashore encouraged to destroy them right on the beach, all kinds of small arms and as soon as possible to call in artillery strikes. The firing was required and the Marines, and heading tools. Have highlighted the sensitivity of the scouts to work spotlights14.
during the autumn of 1942, the enemy defense of the coast between Anapa and Novorossiysk increased markedly. The activity of naval intelligence and forced the enemy command to think about the threat of Soviet Marines. This has created serious obstacles for the landing of Soviet troops near Novorossiysk in February 1943,
the defense of the Caucasus in 1942, began in the conditions of the numerical superiority of the forces of Germany and her allies, their willingness to fight in mountain and forest terrain and mountainous areas. In this difficult situation the command of the North Caucasus front, looking for any opportunities for improvement. One of the steps has been the deployment of anti-sabotage detachments. Despite the difficulties associated with the lack of equipment, lack of experience of warfare in the specific conditions of the Western Caucasus, the operations of Soviet spies caused notable damage to the enemy.
1. Extract from the operational guidelines N 0381/op headquarters of the North Caucasus front 19.8.1942. URL: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=114655097&backurl (date accessed – 27.04.2019).
2. PTR – anti-tank rifle.
3. Order No. 0711/op headquarters of the North Caucasus front 20.8.1942. URL: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/ documents/ view/?id=452502223&backurl (date accessed – 30.04.2019).
4. Central archives of the Ministry of defence of the Russian Federation (RF tsamo). F. 47. Op. 1063. D. 178. L. 50.
5. Help about the actions of a death squad in the band of the 18th army in the period 1 to 15 September 1942 URL: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=455209328&backurl (date accessed – 12.05.2019).
6. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). T. 315. R. 2378. Fr. 000601-000604.
7. Order the troops of the 56th army N 022/n dated 21 September 1942 URL: http://podvignaroda.ru/?#id=150513971&tab=navDetailDocument (date accessed – 11.05.2019).
8. TSAMO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. F. 1721. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 179об.
9. TSAMO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. F. 47. Op. 1063. D. 125. L. 63-65.
10. Bachelors GN Eternal flame. M., 1976. P. 233.
11. Combat chronicle of the Navy. 1941-1942. M., 1983. P. 319.
12. Starshinov N. In. The glow over the waves. Simferopol, 1971. S. 26.
13. NARA. T. 314. R. 257. Fr. 000352.
14. NARA. T. 315. R. 1067. Fr. 000328.
