Ian Matveev is one of the most informed Russian-speaking war commentators and observers. Many international organizations and journalists follow him on Twitter.
Matveev has now summarized in a very long entry why Ukraine is currently so successful. According to him, Ukraine’s success is the “result of a sum of gross mistakes and unresolved problems” in the Russian army.
Matveev sees the following five problems:
All points were reported individually again and again, so Matveev. In the last few weeks, however, it has been shown how much they are related and mutually dependent.
In the three summer months it became more and more apparent that the Russian troops consisted of several military formations. “Not only do they not have a unified command, but they are often at odds with each other,” writes Matveev.
The Russian army is made up of several factions “with their own commanders, control systems and structures. Some have heavy weapons. Others don’t. Some only have transportation, while others hang around the campfire with no socks,” the expert said.
In addition, for some the war is a job, for others it is a duty, and above all the “normal” soldiers have “no idea what they are doing here,” writes Matveev.
The poor supply situation of the Russian army in general is now known, but “especially in the area of the Ukrainian offensive, the situation was particularly unfavorable.” In this way, Ukraine managed to conquer the only three goods transhipment points along the Oskil River. “As a result, during Ukraine’s attack in this area, the Russian army was left empty-handed.”
Added to this is the shortage of supplies. “After six months of war, Putin and Shoigu still do not have a reasonable opportunity to recoup the losses,” writes Matveev.
In addition to the poor training of the army, many officers have been killed or wounded. “A total of 750 of them are junior officers, lieutenants and captains. All are those who work “on the ground” – directly responsible in combat.”
Tactical mistakes: According to Matveev, Ukraine’s offensive to liberate Kharkiv was so successful because the Russian troops in the region were “in a very uncomfortable position”. Arranged in a semicircle, they controlled little space to the north and “but increased the front to be covered.”
In the end, all points interlocked: there was no unified command, no general who had the entire front and all the units there in his hands. And the units that were at the front lacked usable equipment and fighting power.
When the front collapsed, the Russian commanders became frightened and hastily withdrew their troops from the entire Kharkiv region west of the Oskil River. But there was no time to evacuate the collaborators. Eventually, in just a week, the territory that the Russian army had held so tightly fell back to Ukraine.
