In the Ukraine war, Russia is running out of alternatives. In the current phase, Vladimir Putin’s plan seems to be to secure the areas already under Russian control. The annexation is probably his last resort from the war, but Putin could delay it further.
The Ukrainian leadership currently sees the beginning of the third phase of the Russian war of aggression and a protracted struggle associated with it. While phase one was an attempt to overrun Ukraine “in a few days”, the second phase was to encircle and smash the Ukrainian armed forces in several pockets. “And they didn’t manage that either,” said Viktor Andrusyw, adviser in the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior, on television on Saturday night.
In the new third phase, the Russian military prepared to defend the territory gained so far. “It shows that they want to make a long war out of it,” Andrusyw said. Apparently, the Russian government thinks that by prolonging the war, they can force the West to come to the negotiating table and thus force Ukraine to give in.
At this point, the question remains as to the meaning and purpose of this tactic, should Putin pursue it. Even if Russia were able to secure a return to the negotiating table, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently made it clear that he would not accept peace within new borders. “If we take back everything that belongs to us, then we will end the war,” he emphasized on Wednesday.
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But that is a path that is out of the question for Putin. An end to the war without territorial gains would be a bitter bankruptcy for him, which could also get him into trouble in Russia. In the current situation, according to the experts at the Institute for the Study of War, Putin has only one way out: annexation.
Military experts reckon that Putin plans to incorporate the occupied parts of southern and eastern Ukraine directly into the Russian Federation in the coming months. These include parts of the Kherson Oblasts, where Russia has even installed a pro-Russian administration, and Zaporizhia in the south, as well as the areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the east, which are controlled by Russian armed forces and their proxies.
This would also allow Russia to further annex Russian-backed territories outside of Ukraine. The main focus here is on the regions of Transnistria (in Moldova) and South Ossetia (in Georgia).
A referendum like the one held in Crimea in 2014 is not planned. The reason: the lack of recognition of the result, which according to numerous experts was manipulated. According to Kiill Stremousov, deputy head of the civil-military administration in Kherson, a referendum is therefore unimportant. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not disagree, stating that a Russian annexation of Kherson “must have an absolutely clear legal background and justification [and] be absolutely legitimate, as was the case with Crimea.”
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Specifically, according to the Institute for the Study of War, an annexation would trigger another wave of lawsuits and atrocities that Russia would have to initiate in order to gain full control over the named areas. These include the exchange of local media by Kremlin-run media, the installation of Russian internet and communications networks, the forced conversion of the local economy to the Russian ruble, the kidnapping, execution and replacement of local Ukrainian officials with Russian collaborators, and alleged hunting and elimination of anti -Occupation activists and partisans. All of this is part of the Kremlin’s established processes to gain control of occupied territories.
In the course of this, it is likely that Putin will declare, directly or indirectly, that the Russian nuclear weapons doctrine will also apply to the annexed territories. This means that in the event of an attack on the annexed areas, Russia would threaten to defend its own interests by using nuclear weapons and would regard this as legitimate.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, how quickly Russia will implement the plans for the annexation also depends on Putin’s assessment of its own military strength. The stated goal of securing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts has not yet been achieved. Experts also doubt whether Russia’s ailing troops can even realize this. Should Putin come to a similar assessment, it is reasonable to conclude that he will hasten an annexation to threaten nuclear retaliation for an attack on the annexed territories.
However, Russia’s president may also believe his army is capable of gaining more territory. If he came to this conclusion, it would be logical to delay the annexation so that these areas could also be annexed to Russia at a later date. To this end, Putin could try to mobilize more troops in order to be able to act with more armed forces.
However, this is also where the risk for Russia is greatest. If Putin delays the annexation but misjudges the situation, there is a risk of territory being lost. At the same time, this is where Ukraine’s greatest opportunity lies. Targeted counter-offensives could push back Russia’s troops and recapture areas.
Territorial conquests by Ukraine in particular could make it increasingly difficult for Russia’s president to resort to annexation, since Russia’s “success” in the war is becoming smaller and smaller. No matter how Putin gets out of this dilemma, the annexation of occupied territories seems to be his only way out of the war – whether it ends the war or not.
