Five years will be this Friday since the death of former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Over the years, he firmly established in the Pantheon of the most famous Russian public figures. Neither one of the Central streets and squares of Moscow there is still no monument to Boris Yeltsin, but a monument to the scandal was fired the head of the government there. Over the years, however, intensified and irreconcilable ideological opponents Primakov. In his book “Time Berezovsky” Peter Aven called Primakov principled opponent of business. And last fall, retired head of the Kremlin administration under Yeltsin, Valentin Yumashev suddenly issued: “All who were of the political elite, these Zyuganov, Primakov, Yavlinsky, Zhirinovsky, — they are people bored to death”.
I consider myself a person who knows what Yevgeny Primakov was really. And these attacks on his memory caused me irritation and resentment. But then I remembered that is easiest to prove by contradiction. And to prove the fundamental things associated with Primakov, it is very important. The main period of state activity Primakov occurred in the 90-ies of the last century — a time that now seems not even yesterday, and day before yesterday in the afternoon. But the lessons to be learned from state activities, Yevgeny Primakov, is not in the past. They are cutting and in our current time.
the Man who is not confused
“the meeting of deputies Kozyrev, to our great pleasure, allowed himself harsh statements addressed to the Americans: “Some of our best friends wants Ukraine had nuclear weapons, but then let them tell their Congress.” And further: “the Nonsense of Christopher (Warren Christopher was in those years the post of Secretary of state. the — MK), we played with the constructive cooperation.” And more trenchant — “Western kids” — having read in the memoirs of the former first Deputy Minister of foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Anatoly Adamishina this passage about the statements of Russian foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the end of 1993, I almost fell off my chair in surprise.
We used to see Andrei Kozyrev quite different — thus, for example, as he appears in another part of the memoirs of Anatoly Adamishina: “Begin to understand better the roll of the Pro-American Minister. At the Board he says these words: “to Be partners of the United States is the most important. Moreover, it is necessary to be the first partners of the United States, otherwise nothing will remain of great power status”. But they see us as the Junior partner”. What can explain this blatant contradiction in one and the same person at approximately the same time period? So, probably that, according to��Aina extent, during his tenure as Minister Andrei Kozyrev was not yet entirely hopeless politician and diplomat.
Sometimes common sense made its way through the voluntarily stretched on itself, Kozyrev ideological blinders. But these moments were very rare: suddenly seeing reality in all its ugliness, the first foreign Minister of independent Russia immediately hurried back to the comfort of a prisoner is pleasant, but false ideological structures. The first half of 90-ies is considered to be the time of universal devastation. But nowhere was the devastation was not as strong as in the minds. The contrast between the based on a euphoric high expectations August 1991 and apocalyptic and gray reality of January 1992 marked the Russian society on both blades. With the exception of those who lived by the principle “the worse — the better”, the traditional foreign policy elite of the country fell into a state of prolonged and profound psychological frustration.
With this frustration, each of us coped in their own way. Someone like Kozyrev, sought refuge in the false ideological myths. Someone abstracted from reflections on the fate of the country did instead betting on his own feverish enrichment. Someone tried in vain to appeal to reason of the former enemy. In his memoirs working in the first half of the 90s Deputy U.S. Ambassador in Moscow William burns, the following poignant episode: “one night I went to visit a former Soviet diplomat who was now retired. He was a widower and lived alone in a modest apartment in the city centre, immersed in his memories. On the walls hung pictures, made during his trips abroad during the “cold war”. We slowly drank the bottle of vodka outside the window softly falling snow. This man is not particularly missed the Soviet system, knowing full well how it was ineffective and inhumane.
“We deserved it,’ he said. — We lost our way”. He talked about that may need a generation that Russia has regained confidence and rallied, but there is no doubt that sooner or later it will happen. The Russian in any case should not get the impression that the Americans took advantage of their weakness, when Russia turned away from luck. “Remember what Churchill said about the generosity of the winners, — said the diplomat. — Be generous and you will not regret it”.
However, generosity was the last place in the list of what Americans thought in relation to their friendly and democratic Russia. Lavishing praise Yeltsin, in fact, Washington has acted in the spirit of the winged Latin expression “Vae victis” — “Woe to the vanquished”. As noted in their diaries AnatolII the Adamishin: “we Have a growing contradictions with the USA and some other Westerners on Transcaucasia. Even when we put things in order in acute situations, we shoved a spoke in the wheel. The refrain they have one — to prevent the restoration of the USSR”. Faced with such an immense set of challenges, the Russian leadership darted from side to side.
Sometimes the official Moscow was that the Soviet Union continues to exist. For example, the British writer and politician Jonathan Aitken described based on candid conversations with senior Kazakhstani officials the biography of Nazarbayev, the circumstances of arrival to Alma-ATA’s new Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin immediately after his appointment to that position in December 1992: “When the aircraft of the Russian leader landed at the airport, the first person who greeted him, was an official representative of his own government. “I am the Ambassador to Russia!” — started Boris Krasnikov. “Who are you?” — asked him, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, diligently feigning amazement. “I’m the Russian Ambassador,” said Krasnikov. “What do you mean? Who are you the hell?” — demanded Chernomyrdin, brought down on the unfortunate Ambassador a stream of expletives which ended with the following phrase: “If the state thinks that it is independent from Russia is a foreign country, he should think again.”
Sometimes the Russian ruling circles, on the contrary, panic, expecting that Russia here-here will repeat the fate of the Soviet Union. Let me quote another passage from the memoirs of Anatoly Adamishina: “I Recall a conversation with an old friend Igor M. Makarov, scientific Secretary of the Academy of Sciences with academician by Nigmatulinym. People in Tatarstan, he said, already resigned to the fact that he will become an independent state. To collect taxes, he hosting, giving Russia just what certainly not to give. Will have its own internal troops and police. The Russians who live there, and almost half of the population, too, like not against such a prospect. Russia lost every man for himself, create their own state”.
On such a bleak background in the largest deficit in the Russian leadership were those who did not panic or nostalgia, and understand exactly how to operate in the new reality. The most prominent representative of this type of head was the first head of Russian intelligence, Yevgeny Primakov. Was — and in fact could not be. At the head of the Soviet intelligence service Primakov in September 1991, has appointed Gorbachev. As he recalled Primakov in his book “Years in big politics”, here is how events unfolded after less than three months after his appointment, Soviet intelligence became the RussianYu: “the decree of B. N. Yeltsin about creation of the foreign intelligence Service (SVR) of the Russian Federation. Immediately called Yeltsin and asked is not an idle question for me: who will carry out this decree? “It’s not a phone conversation, he said. — Come and talk to me”. At the appointed time was in the Old square. Then the Cabinet of Boris Yeltsin was there. “I trust you, though you will not on this account doubt, but the staff treat you very differently”. — “You know, Boris Nikolayevich, if you said you don’t trust, the conversation will naturally, this would have ended. Neither the head of state does not need a head of intelligence, which he does not believe, nor the service, and to me it is absolutely not necessary. But I am offended that you are informed about bad attitude to me in the exploration. I admit, I don’t feel it, but it cannot be excluded that wrong.” “Well, I’ll meet with your deputies”. — “Some have already appointed myself. The picture will be more objective, if you will meet with the entire leadership is 40-50 people”. — “Come and see me tomorrow at 10am and we will go together to you in Yasenevo”.
At 10.40 in my office brought together the heads of all departments… Yeltsin said: “You, the scouts, are a bold people. So I’m waiting for Frank assessments of your head”. Made of 12 people, and all without exception in favor of my appointment as Director of the SVR. Boris pulled out a leather folder and immediately signed a decree, adding: “I had procured a decree and on the other person, but now his name I will not mention”.
Why I dwell on this episode? Because it allows you to accurately understand the reasons for which Primakov has proved so popular at the time of formation of the new Russian state. A professional Corporation is very wary of “strangers and outsiders”, especially as your first person. For such a closed professional Corporation, as exploration, is a true double or even triple. Why, having the chance to get rid of the “Varyag”, in the headquarters of the newborn in Yasenevo SVR so zealously defending him?
Here’s how I answered this question the current state Secretary of the Union state of Russia and Belarus Grigory Rapota, who served in that time, the position of the head of a Department of intelligence: “Some of us knew Primakov even before his appointment, and understood that it is useful for business people, which will certainly give new impetus to our work. And those who did not know him, very quickly realized: Primakov — head, which is very comfortable to work with. He’s not posing as a know-it-all, you didn’t jump peremptory orders, and before taking any important decision very carefully and thoughtfully listened to prof��of Sinaloa, treated them with trust and respect.” Russian intelligence officers were the first who realized: the set of qualities possessed by Yevgeny Primakov, is exactly what you need in one of the most difficult moments in the history of the country. The first but not the last.
Triumph, fall and triumph again
During one of his meetings with US President bill Clinton in the White house by the Minister of foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Yevgeny Primakov told his welcome master anecdote: “the Chicken asked: “What is your greatest achievement? — “Laid an egg weighing five pounds.” — “Where is your heart?” — “I want to lay an egg weighing seven pounds.” Then the cock asked, “What are you most proud of?” — “My hen has laid an egg weighing five pounds.” — “And what is your dream?” “To kick the ostrich!” As he recalled later, Primakov himself, after hearing this story, Clinton first laughed and then half-jokingly, half-seriously asked: “is This about me?”
This small episode illustrates very well the main features of the diplomatic style of Yevgeny Primakov — the ability simultaneously to firmly defend Russia’s national interests and find a common language with its implacable geopolitical opponents. As I said a mate of Primakov as Minister of foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov: “Primakov understood that to solve the internal problems of Russia the country is vital to have a favorable external environment. Primakov was Minister-realist, the master of compromise, a master of balance. For example, he understood that we have no capacity to curb the expansion of NATO to the East, and tried to soften for Russia the negative consequences of this expansion. Reviving Moscow’s relations with the Arab world, it’s a new built Russia’s relations with Israel. Many of those Western politicians who were opponents of Primakov politically, kept about him a most favorable impression in personal terms. For example, who served during his tenure at the head of the foreign Ministry as Secretary of state Madeleine Albright still holds the house in a visible place a picture of him”.
Why master of maneuver and compromise foreign policy Yevgeny Primakov failed to demonstrate the same quality in the domestic sphere? Why his Premiership ended in unceremonious dismissal after only nine months of appointment? Why, he found himself in the White house, Primakov quickly fell out of favor and Yeltsin’s entourage, and a large Russian business? The answers to these questions are key to understanding the real role of Primakov in the modern andStora Russia and the logic of the development of history itself.
In his great book “the Time Berezovsky” large Russian business magnate Pyotr Aven says: “Primakov was deeply Soviet man, internally hostile and distrusting the business… He was pragmatic and reasonable person, but these deep Soviet instincts were inherent in it… It would be hard, and would just change the socio-political model. So now, looking back, with all the complex attitude to what is happening now, of course, Primakov — it was a big threat to the gains of the ’90s”.
whether Yevgeny Primakov was a principled opponent of the market economy? The current President of the Institute of world economy and international relations Alexander Dynkin, who worked during the Premiership of Primakov, his Advisor on Economics, told me the following: “Primakov was a principled opponent very specific model of market economy — based models, in fact, the free distribution of the future oligarchs the most attractive state property at auctions and illegal withdrawal of capital abroad. But other than that he was the most that neither is a market economy. When he was Prime Minister, Primakov indignantly rejected the proposal to restore the state monopoly of foreign trade, and the idea of cancelling the convertibility of the ruble, and a lot more”.
the Hitch is obtained. What is its real cause? You can tell that by comparing two other fragment of the book of Peter Aven. Dialogue with the former head of the presidential Administration of Boris Yeltsin, one of the architects of the decision on the dismissal of Primakov as Prime Minister Valentin Yumashev. Aven: “that’s Right, I still understand that the merger of business and government (in Yeltsin’s time. “MK”) — to a large extent a myth?” Yumashev: “This is no relation to real events is not. Of course, there were situations when some of the officials lobbied for a group, but it is absolutely isolated facts, which had no relation to the big picture”.
But the story of the Aven of behind the scenes events that preceded the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister in September 1998: “After the first failure (candidate for the post of Prime Minister. the — MK) Chernomyrdin in the Duma, Boris (Berezovsky) traveled all the “oligarchs” and announced that in exchange for the guarantee the approval of Viktor Chernomyrdin the Prime Minister agree to give the business almost carte Blanche to determine the composition of the Cabinet. Therefore, it is necessary to form your own list, to define the goals, the rules of the game, and forward. Actually what he said was that big business will now be directly to run the country.
the Following hours were spent on the approval of candidates, mutuale oath of honesty and determination of overall strategy. Under the agreement, Boris Fyodorov was to lead the Central Bank, Potanin again to become the first Vice-the Prime Minister, I Minister of Finance. The rest do not remember. With a written list we came to Chernomyrdin and seated on two sides of a large table — Boris on the left hand from the acting Prime Minister. “So, Chernomyrdin said, — let your list”. The first was Fedorov with Viktor Stepanovich were bitter enemies. “Fedorov Boris Grigorievich — Chairman of the Central Bank” — read Chernomyrdin — and, closing the list, he added: “But you would not go on ***”. To me (I was third on the list) is not reached.”
the Appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister was to Yeltsin’s entourage desperation. From Primakov expected him to literally save the situation — will lead Russia from a state of acute crisis that threatened to escalate into a complete collapse. As soon as Prime Minister Primakov did it, he immediately turned in the eyes of the presidential entourage in unnecessary and even harmful figure. Primakov himself is, incidentally, is well understood. As I told Alexander Dynkin, Primakov confidently told him that the government will soon be removed in early February 1999, three months before the dismissal of the Cabinet of Ministers.
so, Yevgeny Primakov suffered a political defeat that he tried to play, but couldn’t. At the time of arrival of Putin to the position of acting President of Russia on 31 December 1999 Yevgeny Primakov’s de facto ceased to be an active political player and has become instead, an honored veteran of the Russian political scene. But can we consider this outcome a failure? From the point of view of those for whom the measure of political success are primarily career achievements, and it is possible and even necessary. Having, as it seemed in the summer and fall of 1999, a real chance to become the next President of Russia, Primakov was unable to get the main prize of Russian politics.
But Primakov himself thought absolutely in other categories. Those “toys” that are the object of desire for the vast majority of members of the Russian political class, left him profoundly indifferent. In the early 2000-ies some members of Primakov’s entourage practically begged him to sign a statement about the privatization of his official dacha in the area of the Second Uspenskoe highway. The statement was left unsigned. After the death of Mr Primakov in 2015, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly offered his widow Irina to leave this country in the enjoyment of his family. As I heard from an informed source, Irina politely but firmly refused, saying: “Without him, I it would be hard to be!” Giving back to the balance of the state.
What then it was important for Primakov? One of the close associates of Mr Primakov’s literally removed from my mouth the idea, issuing aphorism: “Putin has not yet chosen a successor, but he has already chosen his predecessor. And it’s not Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich!” Yes, in ideological terms it is certainly not Yeltsin. In ideological terms it is rather Primakov. The priority of national interests in foreign policy, statism, the deformation of the members invented Berezovsky, the “seven bankers” from the helm of governing the country — all these ideas Primakov during Putin’s presidency have become official government slogans.
however, There is one big but, one big question the answer to which we, alas, will never get. As I wrote to the organizer of Primakov’s foreign policy was important not only principles but also the opportunity to practice to achieve success in terms of protecting Russia’s national interests. And it is such success achieved, skillfully using the minimum political resources that were available to our state at that time. Resources that are available to our state now, just not comparable with the situation of the mid and late 90s. But can we say that these resources are manage as skillfully, as did Primakov?
you should Not consider such a question a criticism of those who now steers our foreign policy. This is not a criticism. It is, rather, thinking out loud. Recently, for example, Vladimir Putin asked a question that is already five years going round in my head: acquiring the Crimea lost to Russia all of Ukraine? As expected, the GDP responded in the spirit of their usual rhetoric. They say, we are not in conflict with the fraternal Ukrainian people. We have a conflict only with those who in recent years has been in power in Kiev. I really hope that Vladimir Vladimirovich is right — I hope, but I admit the possibility that Putin is too optimistic about the situation.
People is not something frozen in time. People have a tendency to change their characteristics. Take, for example, the German people. Before I recently read the book “Iron Kingdom” of the famous contemporary historian Christopher Clark, I considered axiomatic: in the nineteenth century, only Prussia had a real chance to act as the “core” of German unification. Imagine my surprise when from the book of Clark’s I learned that even in the early years Otto von Bismarck as Minister-President of the Kingdom of Prussia, the most authoritative German state was not considered as his country, and Austria.
If Bismarck using alternating military and diplomatic methods of struggle, turned Austria into a power of the second plan, the capital of the United Germany could well be Vienna, not Berlin. But historyRiya judged differently. Today Austria is a small country with nine million inhabitants, whose inhabitants speak the German language, but very offended when they are called by the Germans. We should not assume the fraternal relations of Russian and Ukrainian people something that cannot be changed. If this fraternal relationship not to fight for life two or three generations they can go back in time.
Continue on our “tour” of the sore points of contemporary Russian foreign policy. The conflict in Syria. Thanks to the decisive action of Putin in this country in the year of death Primakov, Russia was able to triumphantly return to the middle East. But do not run out the active involvement of Moscow in the Syrian case its usefulness to our national interests? I do not turn for us in Syria “suitcase without a handle”? The deadlock in Russian-American relations, which threatens to get even worse regardless of who wins the next presidential election in the United States. Was able to Primakov, if he were healthy, young (or relatively young — when Primakov headed by our foreign Minister, he was already 66 years) and active, to find “light at the end of the tunnel”? What a pity that Yevgeny Primakov that any of this is not to ask! How painfully hurt by the fact that for the past five years no longer with us!
In his memoirs, Anatoly Adamishina following the story about the visit of Boris Yeltsin to the Russian foreign Ministry on Smolenskaya square in the autumn of 1992: “(Yeltsin) was like a little the offices tenth floor, went down to the dining room with almost complete indifference from the audience. Not often the MFA cafeteria is the President, but only a few of those present drew attention to it”. What caused this attitude? The reasons probably had a lot. But among them was certainly present shame for the fact that Russia was on the margins of world politics, has lost the ability to adequately protect its national interests. Yevgeny Primakov stood at the source of the processes by which this shame is gone. I thank him for it!
P. S. In the Russian power structures appeared again Yevgeny Primakov. Namesake and favorite grandson of the former Prime Minister received the appointment to the post of head of Federal Agency for CIS Affairs and co-homelanders living abroad. I am sure that in his new post, he will not disgrace the memory of his grandfather!
