Russia claims to be a great power. But that is not justified. Although the country has military strength, it clearly lacks in other areas.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is also the result of Russia’s attitude that as a great power it has the right to a sphere of influence. Of course, all major powers have created spheres of influence for themselves. Some through attractiveness and attraction (EU in Eastern Europe), others through coercion and pressure (Russia in Eastern Europe). Russia’s claim that, as a great power, it has the right to have a say in the foreign policy of its Ukrainian neighbor is not fundamentally surprising. But the question that arises is whether Russia can rightly claim to be a great power?
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In order to achieve the status of a great power, it is of course not only necessary to see itself as a great power. The material foundations of such a claim are essential, as is the attribution of roles by other great powers. Is Russia’s self-image of being a great power based on solid material foundations?
Militarily, Russia is undoubtedly a great power. Russia has the largest number of nuclear warheads, has significantly modernized many of them in terms of quality, has developed and built new nuclear weapons and is certainly capable of a devastating retaliatory strike in the event of a nuclear attack on its own territory. However, strategic nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent and are not weapons with which wars (should) be waged. There is nothing to indicate that Russia sees it differently.
Gerhard Mangott is a professor of political science with a special focus on international relations and security in the post-Soviet space. He teaches at the Institute for Political Science in Innsbruck and is a lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna
Although conventional forces have also undergone significant modernization since 2009, failures and sluggish advances in Ukraine have greatly disenchanted their supposed effectiveness. The army has a target strength of 900,000 soldiers, but Russia would lose a conventional war against NATO. Russia also has a tiny fraction of foreign military bases if we compare the country to the US.
Gerhard Mangott is a professor of political science with a special focus on international relations and security in the post-Soviet space. He teaches at the Institute for Political Science in Innsbruck and is a lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna
The Russian claim to be a great power cannot be justified economically or financially. The share of global GDP at purchasing power parity has been declining for years. At 2.92 percent before the pandemic began, Russia was only a fifth of the performance of the United States and only a sixth of China’s GDP. Russia is not a competitive trading power outside of the raw materials sector and the defense industry. But precisely because Russia is primarily an economy that exports raw materials, it is very vulnerable to external shocks such as falling demand or falling prices.
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Russia is also not a major power when it comes to technological competition – measured, for example, by patent applications. Russia has (had) a lot of highly qualified specialists, but many have left the country just in the last few months. With the attack on Ukraine and the resulting sanctions and their aftermath, the economy has also been thrown back decades. The war makes Russia poorer.
With a permanent seat on the Security Council with the right to veto, Russia basically has considerable political and institutional power. But Western military interventions, even without Security Council authorization, have made it clear that Russia’s position in the United Nations can be overturned. As a result of the war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia will also lose a great deal of respect and power in other international organizations.
Russia also has little soft power. Even before the Ukraine war, Russia’s global image was not particularly good. Because of the war, Russia’s reputation has so far declined by 20 percent. Internationally, Russia’s attractiveness as a role model is very low.
Russia is therefore only a sectoral superpower. Outside the military sector, Russia’s claim to be a great power is difficult to justify. At least the conventional military clout was significantly weakened by the Ukraine war.
It will be many years before the Russian army can regain its pre-Ukrainian strength. War may bring territorial gains to Russia. But the price is high – the long-term weakening of the country. This is entirely in the spirit of other great powers.
