On the very day he invaded Ukraine, Putin threatened imminent consequences to uninvolved countries that dared interfere. The use of nuclear weapons has been discussed time and again. But how likely is that really?
“To me, the word ‘impossible’ just means ‘possible in the future,'” joked Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov. And for a good reason. When Russia first occupied Ukrainian territory in 2014, the US banned the use of Javelin anti-tank missiles.
In 2017, although they were slow to begin with, they were delivered in large quantities after the renewed Russian invasion in February. Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which had also initially been refused delivery, arrived in March.
And since June, the long-awaited HIMARS rocket launchers have been shutting down command bases and ammunition dumps far beyond the Russian front. F-16 fighter jets may one day see action as well.
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The US and Europe are enthusiastic about Ukraine’s fighting spirit, but this begs the nagging question: Why not send more weapons, faster? Official bodies provide different explanations for this.
The West is already moving at unprecedented speed; the most urgently needed weapons will be delivered as a priority; Ukrainians must first be trained to operate and maintain their new equipment; and they must prove that they can use them effectively in battle.
The key reason for the US’s reluctance, however, is the fear of an escalation – that Russia might take military action against NATO (called “horizontal escalation” in technical jargon) or use chemical or nuclear weapons in Ukraine (“vertical escalation”) Escalation”).
Any of these options would push NATO into direct conflict with Russia, and President Joe Biden has vowed to avoid “World War III.”
Currently, Ukraine is trying to recapture the city of Kherson. If successful, pro-war advocates will see it as proof that with the right support, Ukraine could win the war, while anti-war fears it could provoke an overreaction from Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Putin threatened uninvolved countries that dared to interfere on the day of his invasion of Ukraine with immediate consequences “unlike they have faced in their history.” Russian state media are spreading wild speculation about nuclear attacks on the West.
For now, however, there is no sign that Russia has put its nuclear forces on high alert, according to the US. The US and Russia continue to share information about their long-range nuclear weapons. On August 1, Biden urged Russia to resume arms control talks.
During the five months of fighting, the red lines that could have led to a direct collision were crossed several times – apparently without serious consequences for the West.
“NATO was great at getting its help in bits and pieces,” said James Acton of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank. “It provided sufficient aid to the Ukrainians, but never provoked Russia to the point of saying ‘this and no further’.”
But not everyone agrees on that. “Any help means more innocent Ukrainians will be killed,” said Ben Hodges, former commander of US forces in Europe. He says the Biden administration “overstated the risk of escalation.”
The Kremlin, he argues, is making terrible mistakes with its atrocities and military operations, and the Russian Navy and Air Force are “afraid” of the Ukrainians. Russia does not want to take on NATO, says the former general, and a nuclear retaliation is highly unlikely.
Others warn that Russia would rather escalate than accept defeat. Samuel Charap of the Rand Corporation, a think tank closely associated with the Pentagon, warns that Russia has untapped military capabilities, especially when it mobilizes.
The Luftwaffe could also be used more intensively. The more the West helps Ukraine, the more Russia will step up its efforts. “There is no such thing as a stable equilibrium,” argues Charap. “We are in a slow and steady spiral of escalation.”
Cold War history suggests that countries can wage fairly lengthy proxy wars with a nuclear power without risking nuclear retaliation (although fear is involved).
Just think of Russia and China, who supported North Vietnam in the war against the USA in the 1970s. Or the US, which armed the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s in order to bring the Soviet Union to its knees.
The doctrine issued by Russia envisages four scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons: upon detection of a ballistic missile attack on Russia or one of its allies, upon attack with nuclear or other weapons of destruction, upon acts that threaten Russia’s nuclear command and control systems, and in an attack against the Russian Federation with conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state.
At first glance, Western arming of Ukraine appears to be well below these red lines. But the notion of an existential threat is flexible, cautions Bruno Tertrais of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think tank in France.
Putin described Ukraine as “a matter of life and death”. He also stressed that any attack on Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, would have similarly serious consequences (and should Russia officially annex more parts of Ukraine, trying to retake it would mean an additional escalation).
Others ask themselves: What if Putin sees himself as a state and any attack on his regime is seen as an existential threat?
A recent Rand Cooperation paper by Charap et al describes four scenarios for a horizontal escalation. The first is called “Pathway 0” because by this time the escalation may already be underway: Russia must respond to the heavy military and economic losses inflicted on it. If not immediately, then “in due course”.
The next scenario would be a pre-emptive attack if Russia believes NATO is about to intervene immediately – for example, it has installed missile systems near the Russian border.
The third scenario could be the bombing of military supply lines supporting Ukraine. Most recently, “a dramatic increase in national, economic and political instability” could be the trigger. In most cases, Russia’s retaliation would likely begin covertly, such as through cyberattacks, sabotage, assassination, or the like.
A pre-emptive strike would most likely result in a military attack, possibly even a nuclear strike. The scenarios could overlap, but “all are dangerous should Russia lose,” adds Mr. Charap.
In truth, no one knows when Putin will cross the red line, not even himself. America no longer talks about helping Ukraine “win” and weakening Russia. Instead, one wants to ensure that Ukraine does not lose the war.
In a May New York Times column, Biden listed several things America would refrain from doing. No attempt would be made to remove Putin from office. You would not send troops to Ukraine or fight against Russia. It would neither encourage nor enable Ukraine to fight Russia. Nor would one “prolong the war to harm Russia.”
Biden warned Russia that using nuclear weapons “would have serious consequences.” The consequences would depend on the circumstances, but officials indicate the attacks could be conventional rather than nuclear. It’s obvious that Biden doesn’t want to let it get that far.
While Biden sidesteps previous self-imposed restrictions, his actual agenda remains unclear. It is known from well-informed sources that high-ranking officials are conducting field exercises to ascertain the final target.
For now, the government is floating in general terms, saying its goal is “a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine.” It does not accept Ukraine’s demand for the return of all lost territories, including those captured by Russia in 2014.
Biden’s policies, whether intentional or not, will produce a protracted war or a grinding stalemate that could shatter the unity and resilience of the West as voters challenge inflation, lack of growth, energy shortages and the price they pay for support Ukraine have to pay, rebel. Of course, that could also be Putin’s goal.
But disenchantment and uncertainty are inherent in nuclear deterrence: America is reluctant to intervene directly and Russia is reluctant to attack NATO. The late economist Tom Schelling maintained that one could not predict when war would break out.
He is not like the sharp edge of a cliff “on which you stand safely, look down and then decide whether to jump or not”. Instead, it corresponds to a slippery slope on which “neither the person standing there nor the spectators can safely assess the risk of a fall”.
With a nuclear exchange looming, who could blame the leaders for choosing their moves with care?
The article first appeared in The Economist under the title “What would push the West and Russia to nuclear war?” and was translated by Andrea Schleipen-Rehbein.
Originally translated as “The 4 Scenarios In Which Russia Would Use Nuclear Weapons” by The Economist.
