Vladimir Putin could never accept that his country would become a regional power. So he wages war and turns his eyes to Europe. Only an overthrow from within could change that.
France and Germany have failed to subjugate Europe in imperialist wars over the past two centuries. Both violent attacks were averted by Europe-wide wars. Europe was reorganized in the Congress of Vienna after Napoleon’s imperialist project and divided into two blocs by the world powers Soviet Union and the USA after Hitler’s imperialist war of annihilation.
The Soviet Union came closest to an imperialist rule over Europe and was able to secure it for some time, almost fifty years. However, it was not able to take over Europe completely because the USA – unlike after the First World War – actively secured the European state order, and it lost its sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe because its social order was not able to keep up with the to keep up with the United States and its allies.
From the beginning of his presidency, Putin’s goal has been to make another attempt to subdue Europe to Russian imperialism. That was the central geostrategic message of his speech in the German Bundestag twenty years ago: Europe must separate itself from the USA in order to be able to play its role in global politics.
Prof. Dr. Thomas Jäger has held the Chair for International Politics and Foreign Policy at the University of Cologne since 1999. His research focuses on international relations and American and German foreign policy.
Russia’s superiority and above all its military power could then encompass western Europe. From then on he publicly pursued this goal in word and deed again and again. Different conclusions were drawn from this in the EU states, defensive ones in the East and soft ones in the West.
This very plan to dominate Europe is also the linchpin for a successful implementation of Russia’s geopolitical purposes, which were presented in December 2020 in the form of two draft treaties. Decouple Europe’s security from the US, meaning the end of NATO; split the EU into zones of different security, heralding its demise; annex the territories of the former Soviet empire to Russia.
Only in this way can Russia become a world power and catch up with the USA and China. Because currently it is large in terms of territory and nuclear weapons, but demographically, economically and technologically not capable of becoming a world power.
Russia has thus triggered a regulatory conflict in Europe. Because unlike the former imperialist states of Spain, France, Great Britain and Germany, which after their relative decline have come to terms with the status of a European regional power, this is not the case with Russia and Putin.
Russia is the only power from the era when Europe ruled the world that wants to remain a world power as a nation state. The other states try to gain international influence by trying to do it together in the EU (which is why Brexit is not permanent).
But Russia wants to be a world power through its own national strength. Putin leaves no doubt about that. Equating his actions in the Ukraine with the actions of Peter the Great is not only interesting from an individual psychological point of view, but is also meant seriously.
At the same time, a global political claim by Russia that goes beyond the status of a European regional power is currently based solely on the military nuclear power. In no other respect does Russia have world power potential if it does not rule Europe imperially and can use its economic and technological resources.
Compared to the French and German attempt to subjugate Europe, the existence of Russian nuclear weapons represents an entirely new reality. Therefore, even now, in the middle of the war, Russia’s borders are not endangered and the states supporting Ukraine are making sure that the weapons supplied are only used against Russian troops on Ukrainian territory. Russian territory is taboo.
It could not be demonstrated more clearly that the alleged threat to Russia’s security through the alliance of other European states is Russian propaganda that is as obvious as it is shallow – which was of course reproduced by many politicians in Germany. It was always flat propaganda.
Because nuclear weapons protect the imperialist state from a military defeat at home. They do not generally protect him from military defeat, as the wars from Vietnam to Afghanistan show. But they protect the security of their own country. Therefore, the danger of the current regulatory conflict for Europe can only be averted by a reorientation of politics through internal transformation in Russia. Or through the defeat of EU-Europe, i.e. an imperialist victory for Russia.
For this reason, the regulatory conflict with Russia will continue as long as Russia is not a post-imperial, saturated state and the USA ensures the balance of deterrence for EU-Europe. However, a saturated Russia should not be confused with the democratization of the country. Autocracies can also be saturated states.
The End of the American Age: Germany and the New World Order
In Europe, the fact that societies themselves decide on the structure of the state order does not apply to the EU, which formally has a common understanding of the structure of the respective national political orders (and often argues about it). In addition, it is advisable not to operationalize value-based foreign policy as a policy of offensive democratization.
Because, firstly, this exceeds the capabilities of most states (and Germany in general) and, secondly, it reduces the stability of the international order that arises from flexibility. Of course, democracies decide for themselves which relationships they enter into with authoritarian states. If democratic societies are willing to pay the price, preventing economic relationships can be a tried and tested means of shaping relationships.
So the war in Ukraine is part of a larger regulatory conflict. In the process of reorganizing the European state order over the past three decades, Ukraine has been left in a security no-man’s-land. This vacuum could not last. The Ukraine war broke out in February because Putin assessed the situation in Ukraine, the EU and the USA as favorable. Its cause, however, lies in 2008 at the latest.
Chancellor Scholz is therefore faced with an important decision that he has been putting off for weeks, mainly out of consideration for his own party. Firstly, he must clearly name the conflict of order in Europe, secondly, formulate the German interests, which are subordinate to the EU, and thirdly, define the scope for value-based foreign policy.
