Vladimir Putin’s second, final war goal is still not given enough attention in this country. In the end, Russia wants to dominate not only Ukraine, but all of Europe. Anyone who dismisses this as completely absurd is making it too easy for themselves. Germany urgently needs a serious threat analysis that goes beyond the poetry with which the government has been lying to itself for the past twenty years.
Russia’s war aims extend far beyond Ukraine. It wants to dominate Europe because only then will it be able to have a say in the international order on an equal footing with the world powers USA and China. Russia is continuing to pursue this goal, even if it is currently only gaining ground in Ukraine, which in no way justifies the loss of so many people, so much material and so much prestige. Not to mention the social and economic future prospects of Russian society that were sacrificed on the Ukrainian battlefield.
The official view in Russia is different. In their propaganda, the “liberation” of Ukraine is progressing slowly because “civilians are being protected”. Those responsible, however, know that they are neither protecting civilians nor conquering cities, but rather occupying bombed-out stony deserts from which people have fled and died.
Both sides in the war know what is at stake: Ukraine wants to emerge from this war as a united nation. Russia wants to prevent that. Not even Russian propaganda dares to claim that Ukraine has already lost the war. This “opinion” is spreading in Germany.
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President Putin was completely wrong in his assumptions about the course of the war. The Russian armed forces found neither military nor political support in the neighboring country, nor did the EU and NATO states disagree over their direct reactions. The United States, Putin’s pathological hate object, was even able to seize the opportunity opened up by Russia to present itself as the number one world power again – and to act accordingly.
In view of this situation, with a view to Russia’s war goals, the question arises as to whether the Russian leadership is still wrong when it assumes that it will ultimately be able to dominate Europe. It cannot achieve this goal militarily. This is documented by the war in Ukraine. Can she achieve it politically?
This is something to think about in order to be prepared for possible actions by Russia that could aim to destabilize European states and encourage authoritarian tendencies in states and societies. Then Russia could once again assume a role that it has played more often in history: being the guarantor power of authoritarian European states.
One only has to think of Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. This can currently be observed in Belarus in particular, where the government has tied its security to Russia’s military power and shies away from, even fears, its own population. This is sufficient for authoritarian government. Could this also happen in other European countries?
Prof. Dr. Thomas Jäger has held the Chair for International Politics and Foreign Policy at the University of Cologne since 1999. His research focuses on international relations and American and German foreign policy.
Before Russia launched a war of aggression against Ukraine, Poland and Hungary were the two EU states in which authoritarian tendencies could be observed most intensively. Executive restrictions on the judiciary and media, an illiberal ideology and strong nationalism put these two states in a special position.
They continue to occupy it, but no longer together, but at the other end of the EU’s orientation resulting from the war. Poland has gained tremendous status. The historically deeply rooted distrust of Russia and a clear policy in which word and deed go together have caused this.
Hungary, on the other hand, has a special role that is viewed with skepticism as at least a half-hearted representative of Russian positions, because a break with Russia is being avoided. The EU can withstand this at the moment, because Hungary is not a country that makes a power-political difference in relations with Russia.
That is why the focus is on the medium-sized European countries in the West, on France, Germany, Spain and Italy. The UK can be left out, not because it is no longer part of the EU, but because for historical reasons it will not adopt a policy of softness towards an aggressor.
The other four states are well-established democracies, but Russia’s calculations could be aimed at changing this. President Putin considers the liberal democracies to be weak, politically and culturally hollow and alienated from their traditions. In his world view, they are willing to make far-reaching political compromises for prosperity.
Does this finding result in effective levers that Russia could use to promote illiberal and nationalist developments in Western Europe in order to support authoritarian tendencies in the political systems – and thus to bring forth the governments that Russia wants to be the guarantor power? And does the war in Ukraine contribute to this?
Some of the consequences of the war have already become apparent: The struggles over the distribution of scarce resources are getting tougher and the loss of prosperity in western societies is becoming more noticeable. These effects can be used politically.
Since a comprehensive threat analysis is beyond the scope here, only exemplary references. In France, society is politically deeply divided and national-populist, anti-Western forces are constantly gaining in importance. In Italy, memories of a government made up of two national-populist parties are still alive. In Spain, the conflict over Catalonia is smoldering. In Germany there have been complaints for years that the political center is thinning out and the fragmentation of the party system could become acute again.
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In all cases, economic slumps, unemployment, cultural and racist prejudices, and skillful agitation can affect the political order from outside. In any case, given the assessment of the European situation by the Russian leadership, it is an obvious possibility that society must consider and prepare for. Because the Russian President thinks that the European democracies are not able to defend themselves, which Germany’s deliberately caused partial inability to defend may have encouraged him.
That is why EU countries need a serious threat analysis that goes beyond the poetry with which governments have been lying to themselves for the last twenty years.
Smart politics starts with looking at reality. German society in particular must learn this again in the area of foreign and security policy. This also means that war in Europe is a real possibility for which states are preparing – if they are governed responsibly. If they are not prepared, the question to ask is: why?
This threat analysis must be designed for the entire state and society as a whole, and it must be used to draw conclusions as to what capabilities the country, which is part of the EU, wants to have at its disposal. Therefore, the threat analysis must also be a basis with which Germany is prepared for several futures. Because no one knows for sure what dangers will threaten in the next few years – and which ones can be ruled out with certainty.
In any case, Russia will only be able to achieve its imperialist goals if it succeeds in promoting illiberal, authoritarian and nationalist tendencies in the states of Europe. Or if this should be possible in the USA.
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