Chancellor Olaf Scholz rejects the restriction of visas for Russian citizens: The war in Ukraine is just “Putin’s war”. By concentrating on Putin, the chancellor is amplifying the representation crisis in Germany.
He will have thought about the answer well in advance. Because it was to be expected that Chancellor Scholz would be asked whether he supported the demand that Russian citizens should no longer be issued Schengen visas. This demand was brought up by the Ukrainian President Zelenskyj, and he was supported by Estonia’s Prime Minister Kallas, among others. The fact that former Russian President Medvedev called this “Nazi drivel” fueled the debate. And how did Chancellor Scholz react to the question? He rejected the restriction of visas and justified it with the sentence: “This is Putin’s war.” You have to distinguish between the two, the factual decision and its justification.
There is no doubt that President Putin gave the order to attack Ukraine. In this respect it is his war, because he is responsible for the outbreak of the war. This differs from the factually untenable, but hyped position in some media, that NATO and especially the USA are responsible for this war. This Russian propaganda, as if it were a “war against Russia”, has taken hold in the public debate, so that the Chancellor’s clarity must be observed at this point.
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Chancellor Scholz is now being accused of using this statement to define responsibility too narrowly, because it is Russia’s war. Russian society’s responsibility for the war would be denied by saying “This is Putin’s war.” In Germany in particular, the concentration of war atrocities on one person seems to block out all political education during the National Socialist period. Therefore, the violent reactions to Scholz are not surprising. It is also undoubtedly true that war crimes are being committed, and not by Putin (who is nonetheless responsible for them), but carried out by Russian soldiers and supported by the Russian population.
The question of how much support there is for this war in Russia is difficult to answer. Opinion polls often give values above 80 percent for approval of the war. In his reports from Moscow, Rainer Munz always points out that the “Z” symbol of support is only very rarely seen. Alexander Etkind, after visiting St. Petersburg in August, writes that everyone he saw hates Putin and the war – but does nothing. This coincides with the observations of the Moscow sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky, who observes that most Russians have no opinion at all about the war and simply ignore it.
90 percent of Russians are apolitical. The remaining 10 percent are then also the ones who respond to opinion polls, which is why high approval ratings for Putin are the result. That being said, expressing a different opinion is dangerous because arrests and convictions will follow. If one also takes into account that many have been arrested and millions have fled the country, the picture becomes more differentiated.
Conversely, the government’s hesitant behavior indicates how its secret services assess public sentiment. The fact that new soldiers are enlisted far away from Moscow and St. Petersburg in particular, that members of non-Russian peoples in particular are conscripted for military service, that given the great lack of soldiers even a partial mobilization does not take place, all this points to the fact that the Government fears society’s reaction. Given the poor economic situation and bleak future prospects, even under Russia’s harshly repressive conditions, the potential for protests might be considered high enough to be avoided at all costs.
Prof. Dr. Thomas Jäger has held the Chair for International Politics and Foreign Policy at the University of Cologne since 1999. His research focuses on international relations and American and German foreign policy.
All this does not make this war Putin’s war. It is Russia’s war against Ukraine. But the black and white assessment can be resolved a little. Not every follower is a supporter of the war and will then have to face the question of what he did to prevent it. Putin’s willing enforcers will be identified. We are already working on that now. Sergey Radchenko has argued that Russia must lose the war in order to be liberated from the national-imperialist self-image. This does not make all Russian citizens supporters of the war, but it does show the political and cultural climate in which apolitical positions can also support government policy.
Did Chancellor Scholz give this answer because he wants to keep future options open to Russia? Because at some point Putin will no longer rule Russia and then the question will arise again in the EU of how to deal with Russia. Does the concentration of the war on Putin mean that there will be scope for cooperation again, even if Russia does not give up on its imperialist goals. After all, for 14 years the federal governments of Merkel – taking the war in Georgia as a starting point – acted with an openly imperialist regime as if (almost) nothing had happened and made Germany dependent on this regime.
The fact that the parties involved, in particular the SPD, CDU and CSU, refuse to come to terms with this policy does not contribute to the confidence of the Eastern European countries in German Russia policy. The question of whether this is Scholz’s motive must currently remain unanswered. The fact that the SPD has not parted with its sympathy for Russia can, however, be determined by the people and positions. Days before the war, people still expressed understanding for Russia’s feeling of being threatened. And years before that, NATO was supposed to stop saber-rattling against Russia. It is not plausible that these attitudes have changed.
Chancellor Scholz should therefore not be surprised that he was denied a leap of faith on this issue. Since he does not justify his policies, those who participate in the debate are left to draw their own conclusions. This is currently not helping to stabilize support for the government. It amplifies the representation crisis in Germany. His predecessor wasn’t interested. He will have to be interested.
It is really an important question whether Russian citizens should not be allowed to enter the EU. On the other hand, it is argued that this undermines the effects of the sanctions and allows them to spread their propaganda further. This would be supported by the fact that they would be able to obtain comprehensive information. Perhaps one can link the issue of visas to the condition of political education, as a course on a ruthlessly brutal war in Europe. Sufficient footage is ready to be shown to those who are being denied what Russia is doing at home.
