Nord Stream 1 has been temporarily shut down. The continued operation of the pipeline also depends on Western partners and the continued existence of sanctions, a spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Thursday. What speaks for a gas supply stop – and what against it.
Putin recently made it clear: “Another application of the sanctions policy can lead to even more serious, without exaggerating, even catastrophic consequences on the global energy market.”
It was an undisguised threat. If the EU imposes new sanctions – and the Commission is currently working on a seventh package of sanctions – Russia will continue to throttle its gas supplies to the EU or even stop them altogether.
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Deliveries have already been curtailed. For weeks now, Russia has only been exporting 42 million cubic meters a day via the Ukrainian gas pipeline network; more than 100 million cubic meters would be possible.
Since mid-June, Gazprom has also cut its supplies via Nord Stream 1 by 60 percent; allegedly because of Canada’s refusal to hand over a serviced gas turbine to Gazprom. Due to maintenance work, gas transport via Nord Stream 1 has finally come to a complete standstill since July 11th.
Will Gazprom resume transport through this line on July 21, the official end of the maintenance work? If so, to which extent? In any case, the company has announced that it cannot guarantee that it will be put back into operation.
The complete interruption of deliveries by Russia has thus become a realistic scenario. Putin could force several EU countries into economic stagnation or even recession. The calculation of the Russian leadership is that the European population will withdraw from supporting the sanctions against Russia in view of high gas prices and a shortage of gas in the coming winter.
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According to Putin, freezing for Ukraine will no longer find majority support in Europe. Energy insecurity should shake the social and then also the political stability of the EU. Putin is speculating that a complete gas supply disruption will force European governments to back down on both sanctions and support for Ukraine.
If the Russian leadership has already decided to stop deliveries, according to Russian calculations, this would have to happen relatively quickly – before the storage facilities in Europe are filled and the resilience of the EU states is significantly higher as a result. Gazprom would then very likely use persistent technical problems as an excuse.
The delivery stop would also harm Russia. It is true that the income from the export of oil and oil products is significantly more important for the Russian state budget than the income generated from gas exports. Nevertheless, the Russian government would suffer significant financial losses if gas supplies were halted.
This is also because pipelined gas cannot simply be shifted to other markets. Almost the entire Russian gas pipeline infrastructure leads to Europe. Only one gas pipeline connects Russia with China. However, the pipeline has a much smaller capacity than the lines that reach Europe.
In addition, the proceeds from gas sales to China are significantly lower than the prices that Russia can charge on the European market. Despite the considerable losses for Russia, a complete halt to deliveries is realistic. Geopolitical goals are more important to Putin than economic and financial costs.
At the same time, the EU is not expected to relax existing sanctions or to refrain from further sanctions against Russia. The EU would then capitulate to a blackmailer; it would be a dramatic loss of face and a geopolitical disaster.
The federal government will not do this either, even if Germany would be hardest hit by a gas supply stop in the EU. Gas shortages will bring industries to a standstill. Gas that could be imported from other sources at very high prices would significantly reduce the competitiveness of the German economy. However, this also applies to other members of the EU.
It is true that the EU is not likely to cave in to Russia. But the political costs of continuing the sanctions policy would be extraordinarily high for those in power in Europe. Many a government could be overthrown.
Gerhard Mangott is a professor of political science with a special focus on international relations and security in the post-Soviet space. He teaches at the Institute for Political Science in Innsbruck and is a lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna
