Haven’t “seriously started” yet: Putin is bursting with self-confidence. One reason: there is no relevant resistance to the war, either within the Russian elite or among the population. But he also wants to demoralize the Ukrainian leadership, and more importantly the people.
Luhansk province fell. The Ukrainian army was able to significantly slow down the Russian advance through massive resistance. Ultimately, however, the Ukrainian soldiers had to withdraw and leave the province to the Russian army.
The Russian leadership is basking in this success, even if the war is far from being won for Russia – or maybe not won at all. In front of his own people, Putin can sell the “liberation” of Luhansk as a great success. Now the Russian army controls 22 percent of Ukrainian territory.
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After the hapless first few weeks, the Russian armed forces have now made significant progress and successes since April. However, the success comes at a high price for the Russian side: the number of dead and wounded is likely to be very high. The invaders also lost a lot of military equipment.
In addition, although Russia has conquered Ukrainian territory, this is dead land. Through heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, Russia has leveled many cities. Of course, the Russian leadership and media propaganda are silent about this.
However, it seems that the military successes have made Putin appear more self-confident, focused and confident again. This is noticeable not only in his physical behavior, but of course also in his statements. “We hear today that they want to defeat us on the battlefield.” They should only try.
“But everyone should know that, all in all, we haven’t really started yet.” These statements by Putin are excessive and drunk with victory. The aim is to signal to the population that nothing – not even Western aid – can stop the success of the “special military operation” in Ukraine.
Gerhard Mangott is a professor of political science with a special focus on international relations and security in the post-Soviet space. He teaches at the Institute for Political Science in Innsbruck and is a lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna
Western assessments that the conventional effectiveness of the Russian army is surprisingly low should be countered with the fact that the Russian side has just not yet used everything it has militarily at its disposal. This is intended to demoralize the Ukrainian leadership, and more importantly the population.
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In the population, again, only a minority is opposed to the war – the higher earning and better educated, tendentially younger urban voter segment. But there are almost no more protests from these either. This has to do with the draconian penalties for illegal anti-war demonstrations and “slander” of the Russian armed forces.
Repression has continued to increase in Russia in recent months. As a result, only a few voice public protest. In addition, many of the creative, highly qualified young Russians have emigrated – fleeing internal repression and the dwindling career and wealth prospects in sanctioned Russia. Putin therefore has no threat to face on the “home front”.
Also read: Analysis by Gerhard Mangott – How Putin wants to drive up our inflation with grain blockades
Inflation is likely to be very high this year at around 15 percent, but still well below the value that was expected three months ago for this year. The leadership is attempting to mitigate the effects of inflation by increasing social spending.
Exports of energies and metals continue to provide the country with large amounts of foreign exchange. The effect of the sanctions will become even clearer in the coming months, but the sanctions shock feared by the Russian side has not materialized.
All of this explains the new arrogance of the Russian leadership, drunk with victory. However, it is by no means certain how far the Russian army can expand in Ukraine. It is likely that in a few weeks they will conquer the part of Donetsk province that is not yet under their control. It is questionable whether further offensives will be possible beyond that. Both soldiers and military equipment are missing for major offensives.
Putin’s victorious behavior will be measured against the new realities to be expected. The Russian leadership is of course aware of these risks, but does not show it to the outside world – neither to its own people nor to the enemy camp.
It is very likely that the war will last for many more months. It will most likely remain a war of attrition. Combat operations will continue as long as both sides expect to be able to achieve military successes in order to improve their negotiating position.
The onset of winter will certainly freeze combat operations significantly. But only temporarily. Spring will come again.
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